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In consistent history quantum theory, a description of the time development of a quantum
system requires choosing a framework or consistent family, and then calculating probabilities
for the different histories which it contains. It is argued that the framework is chosen by
the physicist constructing a description of a quantum system on the basis of questions he
wishes to address, in a manner analogous to choosing a coarse graining of the phase space
in classical statistical mechanics. The choice of framework is not determined by some law of
nature, though it is limited by quantum incompatibility, a concept which is discussed using
a two-dimensional Hilbert space (spin half particle). Thus certain questions of physical
interest can only be addressed using frameworks in which they make (quantum mechanical)
sense. The physicist’s choice does not influence reality, nor does the presence of choices
render the theory subjective. On the contrary, predictions of the theory can, in principle,
be verified by experimental measurements. These considerations are used to address various
criticisms and possible misunderstandings of the consistent history approach, including its
predictive power, whether it requires a new logic, whether it can be interpreted realistically,
the nature of “quasiclassicality”, and the possibility of “contrary” inferences.
I. INTRODUCTION
The consistent history approach [1–7] to quantum theory provides a precise conceptual
framework for describing how a closed quantum system (isolated from its environment, or
with the environment itself included as part of a single closed system) develops in time.
It reproduces the results of standard textbook quantum theory while avoiding the well-
known paradoxes associated with the “measurement problem”, Bell’s inequality, and the
like [7,8]. It shows promise for application to quantum optics [9], quantum computing [10]
and quantum cryptography [11].
At the same time, the consistent history approach has been the subject of various criti-
cisms [12–20] which center upon the fact that the formalism allows the physicist to choose
from a very large number of alternative frameworks or consistent families of histories, all
of which are considered “equally valid” in the sense that no fundamental physical law de-
termines which family should be used in any given case. Were this “freedom of choice” the
counterpart of gauge symmetry in classical electromagnetism, it would be of no concern.
However, different frameworks are often mutually incompatible in a manner which means
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that the use of one to describe a given physical system precludes the use of another, that
certain questions can only be addressed if one uses the appropriate framework, and that
results from incompatible frameworks cannot be combined to form a single quantum de-
scription. The resulting conceptual problems have given rise to the claim that consistent
history quantum theory is incomplete and lacking in predictive power [16,17], that it is logi-
cally incoherent and incompatible with physical realism [12–15], or that the physicist’s choice
(within this interpretation of quantum theory) must necessarily influence reality [12,15].
While all of these claims can be countered by a detailed analysis based upon consistent
history principles, as we shall see below, the fact that they have been made by scientists
who have studied consistent histories in some detail means that the conceptual problems
which give rise to them are likely to trouble others as well. Hence the present paper contains
a detailed examination of these problems, using a systematic formulation of the consistent
history approach published under the title “Consistent histories and quantum reasoning”,
hereafter referred to as CHQR [7]. Indeed, the arguments presented below are a continuation
of a discussion already begun in CHQR as to how the formal principles of consistent history
quantum theory, which appear to be sound, should be understood in physical terms and
applied in particular situations. The basic conclusion of the present paper is that the
criticisms mentioned above do not indicate any deficiency or lack of logical coherence in the
consistent history approach, once it is properly understood. Instead, the main problem is
that the full import of the “single consistent family” condition, which prohibits combining
results from incompatible families, has not always been appreciated, despite the fact that
it was stated in the very first publication devoted to consistent histories [21], and has been
repeated many times since [22]. In addition, even physicists who accept the usual Hilbert
space formulation of quantum mechanics often adopt, without giving the matter enough
thought, a mode of reasoning about its physical consequences which is in basic conflict
with the underlying mathematics. A consequence is that one of the few interpretations of
quantum theory constructed in such a way that its rules of reasoning are consistent with
Hilbert space mathematics is criticized for being logically incoherent!
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II contains a brief review of the principles
of consistent history reasoning as found in CHQR, followed by applications of these principles
to a simple gedanken experiment. Various consistent families, or frameworks, which are
incompatible with each other are constructed, and it is shown how they can be used to
derive a variety of physical conclusions. The problems of choice and of incompatibility
emerging from this example are summarized at the end of the section.
The analysis of these two problems begins with a discussion of various classical analogies,
in Sec. III. Here it is argued that the choice of a quantum framework is, among other things,
like the choice of a coarse graining for a classical phase space, and hence can properly be
considered a choice made by the physicist, not a consequence of some “law of nature”.
However, incompatibility between frameworks is a quantum effect with no good classical
analog, and must be dealt with in quantum terms. This is the topic of Sec. IV, in which
properties of a spin half particle are used as a sort of quantum analogy in order to discuss
general properties of quantum incompatibility. In addition, a simple example shows how
the predictions of consistent histories for what goes on in a closed quantum system can, in
principle, be confirmed by experimental measurements.
Section V begins with a summary of the conclusions which can be drawn from the preced-
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ing arguments, and then continues with some applications to various criticisms and (actual or
potential) misunderstandings of the consistent history approach. These include the question
of whether consistent histories requires a new form of logic, whether it can be interpreted in
a realistic sense, a reply to the claim that the consistent history approach lacks predictive
power, comments on the nature of “quasiclassicality”, and reasons why there cannot be a
“list of true histories”. The appendices contain somewhat more technical arguments which
address recent claims that consistent history quantum mechanics allows “contrary infer-
ences” [19,20], and that it cannot reproduce consequences of standard quantum mechanics
even if the future is thought to be “quasiclassical” [18].
II. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE OF QUANTUM REASONING
The basic structure needed in order to treat quantum mechanics as a probabilistic theory
is the same as for all other types of probabilistic reasoning: a sample space of mutually
exclusive elementary events, one and only one of which occurs. These “events” in the
quantum case are elementary histories; see Sec. II below for some examples. They are
analogous to the classical histories obtained by flipping a coin several times in a row. For
example, the sample space for a coin flipped three times in a row consists of eight sequences,
HHH, HHT, . . . TTT, (H=heads, T=tails), one and only one of which is actually realized
when the experiment is carried out.
Compound events, which are collections of elementary events, together with the ele-
mentary events themselves, constitute the Boolean event algebra to which probabilities are
assigned. (In the example of coin flipping just mentioned, the four sequences correspond-
ing to “H on the first toss” are a compound event.) In the quantum case, the algebra of
events is called a consistent family or framework. It must be chosen according to appro-
priate quantum mechanical rules, as discussed in CHQR. Provided these rules are satisfied,
probabilities are assigned using a set of non-negative weights calculated from the unitary
time evolution engendered by Schro¨dinger’s equation. Given these probabilities, the physical
consequences of the theory, typically in the form of conditional probabilities, are calculated
following precisely the same rules as in other applications of standard probability theory.
The peculiar features of quantum theory come about from the fact that there are usually
a large number of different ways of choosing the sample space or consistent family, and it
is necessary to pay careful attention to which of these is being used to study a particular
problem. In classical physics it usually suffices to consider a single sample space, and in those
instances in which more than one is used, relating the different sample spaces is relatively
straightforward, unlike quantum theory, where the rules are more complicated. For further
details, see CHQR.
A simple example which will serve to illustrate the principles of quantum reasoning just
discussed is shown in Fig. 1. A photon which is initially in channel a passes through a
beamsplitter B and is later detected by one of two detectors, C and D. The unitary time
evolution produced by the beamsplitter takes the form
|a〉 7→ |s〉 = (|c〉+ |d〉)/
√
2, (2.1)
where |a〉 is a wave packet for the photon in the entrance channel a, |c〉 and |d〉 are wave
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packets in the exit channels c and d, and |s〉 is a coherent superposition of the latter. The
interaction of the photon with each of the detectors is given by the unitary transformations
|c〉|C〉 7→ |C∗〉, |d〉|D〉 7→ |D∗〉, (2.2)
where |C〉 indicates a detector in a state ready to detect a photon, and |C∗〉 the state which
results when the photon is detected. Note that |C〉 and |C∗〉 differ from each other in some
macroscopic, visible property; for example, the position of a pointer. The states |D〉 and |D∗〉
of the other detector have a similar interpretation. Some other particle, such as a neutron,
could replace the photon without altering the following discussion in any significant way.
Or one could imagine a spin-half particle going through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus which
separates an Sx = 1/2 initial state into two beams with Sz = 1/2 and Sz = −1/2 directed
to separate detectors.
In the consistent history approach, the photon and the detectors are thought of as forming
a single, closed quantum system, and the quantum mechanical description applies to the
system as a whole. (In principle the beam splitter should also be included, but since its
quantum state plays no role in the following discussion, it is omitted so as not to clutter up
the notation.) The unitary time development of the total system then takes the form
|Ψ0〉 7→ |sCD〉 7→ |S〉, (2.3)
where
|Ψ0〉 = |aCD〉, (2.4)
the initial state at a time t0, evolves under the action of Schro¨dinger’s equation to a state
|sCD〉 at a time t1 when the photon has passed through the beam splitter, and then to
|S〉 = (|C∗D〉+ |CD∗〉)/
√
2 (2.5)
at a time t2 after the photon has been detected by one of the detectors. Since |C∗〉 and |C〉
are macroscopically distinguishable, as are also |D〉 and |D∗〉, |S〉 is a macroscopic quantum
superposition (MQS) or “Schro¨dinger’s cat” state.
One can think of (2.3) as a quantum history based upon the three times t0, t1, and t2.
In the notation of CHQR it is represented as a projector
Ψ0 ⊙ sCD ⊙ S (2.6)
on the tensor product space of histories, where we adopt the convention, here and below,
that a symbol outside a ket denotes the corresponding projector, for example,
S = |S〉〈S|. (2.7)
For present purposes the tensor product structure is not important, and (2.6) should simply
be thought of as a statement that the system started off in the initial state Ψ0 (or |Ψ0〉) at
t0, was in a state sCD at t1, and in the state S at time t2. The consistent history approach
supports such a “realistic” interpretation for reasons indicated in CHQR and in Sec. IVC
below.
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The first consistent family or framework F1 we shall discuss has a sample space of
elementary families consisting of (2.6) together with three additional histories
Ψ0 ⊙ sCD ⊙ S˜, Ψ0 ⊙ (I − sCD)⊙ S, Ψ0 ⊙ (I − sCD)⊙ S˜, (2.8)
where I is the identity operator on the Hilbert space, and
S˜ = I − S, (2.9)
is the negation of S, and means “S did not occur”. The four projectors in (2.6) and (2.8)
are the elementary histories which constitute the sample space of F1. (They sum to Ψ0
rather than to the history space identity because we regard F1, along with the families we
shall consider later, as having a fixed initial event; see remarks towards the end of Sec. III in
CHQR.) However, quantum theory assigns a weight of zero to the histories in (2.8), which
means they are dynamically impossible, and have zero probability to occur. When discussing
other families, we will usually not display the zero-weight histories explicitly.
Because the sample space has only one history, (2.6), with finite weight, we can infer
that
Pr(S2 |Ψ0) = 1, (2.10)
where the subscripts, in this and later formulas, always refer to the times at which the events
occur: S2 is a shorthand for “S at time t2”. Thus, given that the system was in the state
|Ψ0〉 at t0, it will certainly (with probability 1) be in the state |S〉 at time t2. As is well
known, unitary time evolution of this sort is something of an embarrassment for standard
quantum mechanics, because physicists typically prefer to draw the conclusion that at time
t2 the system is in one of the two states |C∗D〉 or |CD∗〉, each with a certain probability,
rather than in the hard-to-interpret MQS state |S〉. The endless discussions about how to
interpret the state |S〉 and resolve the corresponding “measurement” problem have been
rightly criticized by Bell [23].
The consistent history solution to this measurement problem is to introduce a distinct
consistent family F2 based upon a sample space of elementary histories
Ψ0 ⊙ sCD ⊙ C∗D, Ψ0 ⊙ sCD ⊙ CD∗, (2.11)
together with others of zero weight, such as Ψ0 ⊙ sCD⊙C∗D˜. The physical interpretation
of the first history in (2.11) is as follows: At t0 the photon was in state |a〉 and the detectors
were ready, at t1 the photon was in |s〉 and the detectors remained in the ready state, whereas
at t2 detector C had detected the photon, while D was still in its ready state, indicating that
it had not detected the photon. The second history in (2.11) has the same interpretation
with the roles of C and D interchanged.
A straightforward application of the rules for calculating probabilities given in CHQR
yields the results
Pr(C∗2 |Ψ0) = 1/2 = Pr(D∗2 |Ψ0), (2.12)
where, once again, the subscript 2 indicates an event at the time t2. In words, (2.12) tells
us that, given the initial state |Ψ0〉 at t0, at time t2 the probability is 1/2 that detector C
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will have detected the photon, and 1/2 that it will have been detected by D. Similarly, one
can show that
Pr(C∗2 ∨D∗2 |Ψ0) = 1, Pr(C∗2 ∧D∗2 |Ψ0) = 0, (2.13)
where “∨” stands for (non exclusive) “or”, and “∧” means “and”. That is, at t2 it is certain
(probability one) that one or the other of the detectors has detected the photon, and it is
not true (because the probability is 0) that both detectors have detected the photon.
Thus by using family F2, the consistent history approach provides a definite, albeit
probabilistic, answer to the question “which detector detected the photon?”, and this is the
answer which everyone who uses standard quantum theory agrees is correct. Notice that
this is done without the MQS state |S〉 ever entering the discussion and causing the sort of
confusion pointed out by Bell [23]. Indeed, according to consistent history rules, |S〉 at time
t2 cannot enter a discussion based upon F2, because it is incompatible with the histories in
F2 in the sense that it cannot be added to F2 without violating the rules for constructing
quantum event algebras. In particular, the event algebra must be a Boolean algebra of
projectors, and the projector S does commute with either C∗D or CD∗, so cannot be part
of a Boolean algebra which contains the latter. Combining any discussion of |S〉 at time t2
with F2 violates the single framework rule of quantum reasoning, CHQR Sec. III. For the
very same reason, it is impossible to include either C∗ or D∗ at time t2 in family F1, and
hence, if one employs F1, one cannot, according to the rules of consistent history quantum
theory, address the question of which detector has detected the particle. Such a discussion
is “meaningless” in the technical sense that this interpretation of quantum theory assigns it
no meaning. In the consistent history approach one cannot interpret |S〉 to mean “|C∗D〉
or |CD∗〉 for all practical purposes”, or for any other purposes.
Quantum incompatibility is also the reason why we cannot combine (2.10) with (2.12)
to reach the conclusion
Pr(S2 ∧ C∗2 |Ψ0) = 1/2, (2.14)
a result which would follow immediately by standard probabilistic reasoning from (2.10) and
(2.12) if these probabilities were based upon the same sample space. But the sample spaces
for F1 and F2 are distinct, and they cannot be combined to form a common sample space.
This is a typical quantum mechanical effect which serves to define when two consistent
families are mutually incompatible. Consequently, the left side of (2.14) is meaningless, and
assigning it the value 1/2, or any other value, is a logical error.
Now consider a third family of histories F3 based on a sample space containing two
histories of finite weight,
Ψ0 ⊙ c⊙ C∗, Ψ0 ⊙ d⊙D∗, (2.15)
together with additional histories of zero weight. (The projectors at t1 and t2 in the histories
in (2.15), unlike those in (2.11), do not project onto pure states. However, one could replace
c with c CD, C∗ with C∗D, etc. without altering the following discussion.) The family F3 is
obviously incompatible with F2 because the projectors c and d at t1 do not commute with
s, and it is obviously incompatible with F1 for the same reason, and also because of the
detector states at t2.
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The conditional probabilities (2.12) can be derived in F3 as well as in F2; this reflects
a very general result (CHQR Sec. IV) that conditional probabilities of this type always
have the same values in any framework in which they can be defined, whether or not the
frameworks are incompatible. In addition, in F3 (but not F2) one has
Pr(c1 |Ψ0) = 1/2 = Pr(d1 |Ψ0), (2.16)
a sort of microscopic analog of (2.12). In words, given the initial state at t0, one can conclude
that at time t1 the photon will be either in the c channel with probability 1/2, or in the d
channel with the same probability. Note that these probabilities, unlike those of standard
textbook quantum theory, make no reference to measurements, which only take place some
time later. That later measurements yield corresponding probabilities, (2.12), is perfectly
consistent with the general principle, see Sec. IV D, that the probabilities assigned to events
and histories by the consistent history approach can always be checked, in principle, using
suitable (idealized) measurements. (Measurements play no distinguished role in consistent
history quantum mechanics; if a closed quantum system contains some measuring apparatus,
the events involving the apparatus are analyzed in precisely the same way as all other events.)
Both (2.12) and (2.16) can be obtained by straightforward application of the Born rule
of standard quantum theory (although its use in (2.16) might be regarded as problematical
by some practitioners, since no measurement is involved). But the next result,
Pr(c1 |Ψ0 ∧ C∗2 ) = 1, Pr(d1 |Ψ0 ∧ C∗2) = 0, (2.17)
goes beyond anything one can calculate with the Born rule. It says that given the initial
state, and the fact that at t2 it was detector C which detected the photon, one can be
certain that at time t1 the photon was in the c channel and not in the d channel. Given the
arrangement shown in Fig. 1, this is a very reasonable result, and shows another way in which
consistent history methods make sense out of quantum measurements. That appropriate
measurements will reveal properties a measured system had before it interacted with the
apparatus is a principle used constantly in the design of experimental equipment, and the
inability of standard textbook quantum mechanics to explain this is a defect just as serious
as its inability to deal with Schro¨dinger’s cat.
Notice that the result just discussed can be obtained using F3, but not F2 or F1. The
question “was the photon in c or d at time t1?” is not meaningful in F1 and F2 because the
projectors c and d needed to answer it are incompatible with these families. On the other
hand, if we use F2 we can derive the result
Pr(s1 |Ψ0 ∧ C∗2) = 1. (2.18)
That is, under the same conditions as in (2.17), one can conclude with certainty that at
time t1, the particle was in the superposition state |s〉 defined in (2.1). Just as in the
case of (2.10) and (2.12) discussed earlier, because (2.17) and (2.18) were derived in two
incompatible families, they cannot be combined to reach the nonsensical conclusion
Pr(c1 ∧ s1 |Ψ0 ∧ C∗2) = 1, (2.19)
which, were it correct, would be the analog of asserting that a spin half particle has both
Sx = 1/2 and Sz = 1/2 at the same time.
7
In summary, we have studied the gedanken experiment shown in Fig 1 using three sep-
arate and mutually incompatible frameworks or consistent families, F1, F2, and F3, each
based upon its own sample space of histories involving events at the three times t0, t1, and
t2, and have derived a number of different (probabilistic) conclusions. There are many (in
fact, an uncountably infinite number of) other frameworks which could have been employed
to discuss the same situation. The fact that the same physical system can be discussed using
many different frameworks gives rise to the problem of choice: how does one decide which
framework is appropriate for describing what goes on in this closed quantum system?
A partial answer is suggested by the fact that certain questions of physical interest, such
as “which detector detected the photon?”, and “which channel was the photon in before
it was detected?” can be addressed in certain families but not in other families, because
the projectors needed to provide a quantum mechanical representation of the question are
only compatible with certain families. Thus incompatibility serves to limit choice, but at
the same time it gives rise to the problem of incompatibility : how are we to understand the
existence of, and the relationship among incompatible histories and families?
These two problems will be discussed in the following sections, beginning with classical
analogies in Sec. III, which will help us understand something of what is involved in choos-
ing a quantum framework. Unfortunately, there is no good classical analog of quantum
incompatibility, so the discussion of this concept in Sec. IV is based upon simple quantum
examples. Combining the results from these two sections leads to the conclusions stated in
Part A of Sec. V.
III. CLASSICAL ANALOGIES
No classical analogy is fully adequate for understanding the implications of quantum
theory, which must, in the end, be considered on its own terms. Nevertheless, classical ideas
can be extremely helpful in suggesting fruitful ways to think about quantum principles. This
is particularly true for the problem of choice, where classical analogies suggest (though they
obviously cannot prove) that the freedom a physicist has in choosing a framework does not
render the resulting theory unscientific or lacking in objectivity, nor does it mean that the
physicist’s choice somehow “influences reality”.
As a first analogy, consider a professional historian composing a history of Great Britain.
Obviously, as a practical matter, he must choose to emphasize certain subjects and ignore,
or at least give much less consideration, to others. The choice of topics is determined by
what interests the historian (or perhaps the pressures on his professional career), and are
not the consequence of some “law of history”. Nor does his choice have any influence on
historical events (at least those occurring prior to when his work is published). Nevertheless,
the account he produces, if he does his job well, is not a purely subjective one, and other
historians dealing with the same subject matter ought to concur about the historical facts,
even if they disagree, as they surely will, about their significance.
A second analogy is provided by a draftsman producing a representation of a three-
dimensional object on a two-dimensional piece of paper. In order to do this, he has to
choose some perspective from which to view (or imagine viewing) the object. This choice is
not determined by any “law of representation”, though it can be influenced by pragmatic
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considerations: some things can be better represented using one perspective than another.
Nor, obviously, does the choice influence the object itself, although it constrains the amount
and type of descriptive information which can be included in the drawing.
The choice of gauge in classical electromagnetism provides a third analogy. This choice
is a matter of convenience which obviously does not influence the system being described. In
addition, the same physical conclusions can be drawn using any gauge, so the choice is based
entirely on pragmatic considerations. To be sure, this is different from what encounters in
the case of quantum families, since, as noted repeatedly for the example in Sec. II, the topics
one can discuss, and thus the conclusions one can draw, do depend upon which family is
employed. Nonetheless, a particular conditional probability can often be calculated in many
different families, and in all families in which it can be calculated it has the same value.
Thus, for example, (2.12) can be obtained using either F2 or F3, though not F1. Hence,
relative to a particular conditional probability, the choice among the families in which it can
be computed is similar to the choice of a gauge.
Classical Hamiltonian mechanics, which describes a mechanical system with N degrees of
freedom by means of a 2N -dimensional phase space Γ, provides a fourth analogy. To be sure,
once the phase space and the Hamiltonian have been specified, the only remaining choice is
that of the appropriate phase space trajectory or orbit, γ(t), and this is typically made by
assuming that the state γ of the system is known at some time, say t = 0. While this choice
bears some resemblance to the quantum choice problem, the disanalogies outnumber the
positive analogies. Thus in the quantum case, with the exception of histories involving only
one time, there is always more than one family consistent with a specification of the quantum
state at an initial time. This reflects the fact that quantum mechanics is a stochastic
theory, unlike classical mechanics, which is deterministic. In addition, the choice between
classical trajectories is a choice between mutually exclusive alternatives: if one trajectory
is a correct description of the system, all others must be incorrect. By contrast, the choice
between consistent families is never a choice between mutually exclusive alternatives in this
same sense, and while different quantum frameworks can be incompatible, incompatibility
is a very different relationship from that of being mutually exclusive, as will be shown in
Sec. IV. Nevertheless, it is probably useful to include classical mechanics among our list of
analogies, if for no other reason than that the disanalogous features are sometimes employed
to analyze consistent history results, leading to the (erroneous) conclusion that the latter
are unsatisfactory.
Classical statistical mechanics, itself a stochastic theory, provides a better analogy for
the quantum choice problem than does classical mechanics. Thus our fifth analogy is a
coarse graining of the classical phase space (CHQR, Sec. VII A), a covering of Γ by a set
of non-intersecting cells, which provides a coarse-grained description of the system through
specifying which cell is occupied by the phase point at a succession of times. (Making these
a finite set of discrete times, and allowing the cells defining the coarse graining to depend
upon time, produces the closest analogy with the quantum case.)
Choosing a coarse graining and choosing a quantum framework are analogous in that
in both cases the choice is one made by the physicist in terms of the physical problems
he wishes to discuss, and is not something dictated by the laws of nature. At least in the
case of the classical coarse graining, it is at once obvious that this choice has no influence
on the behavior the system being described, although it may very well limit the type of
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description which can be constructed. For example, in order to describe irreversible or other
hydrodynamic behavior, one wants cells which are not too large, but also not too small.
Because the coarse graining is chosen by the physicist, the corresponding description can
be said to be “subjective”, but this is a harmless subjectivity, because two physicists who
use the same coarse graining will reach identical conclusions. There is another analogy in
that once a coarse graining has been specified, one and only one coarse-grained history will
actually occur, since a phase space trajectory will be in precisely one cell of the coarse
graining at any given time. In probabilistic terms, a succession of cells from the classical
coarse graining at a sequence of different times is an element of a sample space, just as an
elementary history in a quantum framework is an element of a sample space, and given a
sample space, one expects that one and only one of the constituent “events” will actually
occur.
Along with the positive analogies just discussed, there is an important disanalogy be-
tween descriptions based on classical coarse grainings and those which employ quantum
frameworks. Two classical coarse grainings always possess a common refinement, a third
coarse graining constructed from the intersections of the cells in the two collections. Thus
given any two coarse-grained histories which describe the same system (over the same time
interval), there is always a finer-grained history constructed using the common refinement,
and which incorporates, or implies, each of the coarser histories. The ultimate refinement of
all coarse grainings is, of course, a description of the system in terms of a phase space tra-
jectory. Two compatible quantum frameworks possess (as a matter of definition) a common
refinement, and for them the situation is quite analogous to the classical state of affairs just
discussed. However, incompatible frameworks often arise in quantum theory, as illustrated
in Sec. II, and their mutual relationship is necessarily different from that which exists among
(always compatible) classical coarse grainings.
The solution to the problem of (quantum) choice suggested by the classical analogies
discussed above (with the exception of classical mechanics, where a good analog of a quantum
choice does not exist) is that the choice can be made on pragmatic grounds, that is to say,
relative to the physical problems which concern the physicist who is constructing a quantum
description. There is, to be sure, no guarantee that this solution is the correct one, for
analogies have their limitations, and we have just noted an important one in the case of
classical statistical mechanics (which also applies to the other examples in this section):
there is nothing which corresponds to quantum incompatibility. On the other hand, there
is also no reason to suppose that, just because they are imperfect, the analogies have led us
to a false solution of the choice problem. To obtain further insight, we need to take a closer
look at quantum incompatibility in quantum terms. That is the subject of the next section.
IV. QUANTUM INCOMPATIBILITY
A. Logic in two dimensions
In Sec. II we introduced three separate consistent families of histories, or frameworks,
to describe the same physical system. The analogy of the draftsman in Sec. III suggests
that these can be thought of as three distinct, but equally valid, perspectives from which
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to describe the system. However, none of the analogies of Sec. III provides insight into the
fact that F1, F2, and F3 are incompatible alternatives. Quantum incompatibility of this
sort has no good classical analog, so one needs to employ quantum examples in order to
understand it. The simplest non-trivial quantum system, a two-dimensional Hilbert space,
which we shall think of as representing the angular momentum states of a spin half particle,
can provide some useful insight into what is going on. The discussion given here employs a
somewhat different point of view from that in CHQR Sec. VI A, and can be thought of as
supplementing the latter.
The histories of interest involve only one time, and the “event” at this time corresponds
to a ray, or one-dimensional subspace of the Hilbert space, whose physical interpretation is
that the component of spin angular momentum in a particular direction in space is 1/2 (in
units of h¯). For example, a particular ray which we denote by Z+ (the same symbol denotes
the ray and the projector onto the ray) corresponds to the proposition “Sz = 1/2”. What
corresponds to the negation of this proposition, to “it is not the case that Sz = 1/2”? While
one might suppose it to be “the spin is in some other direction”, standard quantum mechanics
identifies negation of a proposition with the orthogonal complement of the corresponding
subspace, which means that the negation of “Sz = 1/2” is the unique ray Z
− perpendicular
to Z+, which corresponds to the proposition “Sz = −1/2”. Understanding negation in
this way has a certain plausibility: after all, if Sz is not equal to 1/2, what other value
can it have? Furthermore, applying negation twice in a row brings us back to the original
property. Nonetheless, the translation of logical terms, such as “not”, into a quantum context
is a nontrivial matter, and the reader who is not content with the traditional approach is
welcome to try and improve upon it.
If we agree that the negation of a ray R in a two-dimensional Hilbert space is the
orthogonal ray R˜, the next question to address is the definition of “R and S” (R ∧ S) for
two rays. Guided by the rules of ordinary propositional logic, it is plausible that if S = R,
then R ∧ R = R, and if S is the negation of R,
R˜ ∧ R = R ∧ R˜ = 0, (4.1)
where 0 is proposition which is always false, corresponding to a projector onto the origin of
the Hilbert space. But what if S is neither R nor R˜? We might suppose that in such cases
there is always a third ray T (which depends, of course, on R and S) such that
R ∧ S = T. (4.2)
However, (4.2) is unsatisfactory, for consider the result
R˜ ∧ T = R˜ ∧ (R ∧ S) = (R˜ ∧R) ∧ S = 0 ∧ S = 0 (4.3)
obtained by applying the usual logical rules governing “∧”. For this to hold, T must be
the same as R, since in all other cases we are assuming that R˜ ∧ T is another ray, not 0.
However, the argument in (4.3) applied to T ∧ S˜ tells us that this, too, is 0, so that T must
be the same as S. But T cannot be equal to both R and S, since, by hypothesis, they are
unequal.
One way out of this dilemma is to follow Birkhoff and von Neumann [24] , and assume
that whenever R and S are unequal, “R and S” is false:
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R 6= S⇒R ∧ S = 0. (4.4)
Taking the negation of both sides of the equality in (4.4), and using the usual rules of logic,
we conclude that, under the same conditions, “R or S” (R ∨ S) is true:
R 6= S⇒R ∨ S = I, (4.5)
where I represents the proposition which is always true, corresponding to the identity op-
erator on the Hilbert space. Alas, (4.4) and (4.5) lead to a contradiction if we employ the
standard distributive law of propositional logic:
Q ∨ (R ∧ S) = (Q ∨R) ∧ (Q ∨ S). (4.6)
The reason is that if Q, R, and S are three distinct rays, the left side of (4.6), using (4.4)
and assuming that Q ∨ 0 = Q, is Q, while the right side, see (4.5), is I ∧ I = I. Birkhoff
and von Neumann’s solution to this problem is to adopt a “quantum logic” in which (4.6)
no longer holds.
Consistent histories has a very different way of escaping the dilemma posed by (4.3).
When S is different from either R or R˜, the properties corresponding to these two rays are
said to be incompatible, and R ∧ S is considered to be meaningless : it is not a formula
composed according to the syntactical rules which govern meaningful quantum discourse.
To illustrate the difference between this and the approach of Birkhoff and von Neumann,
suppose that Sz = 1/2 is true. According to (4.4), “Sx = 1/2 and Sz = 1/2” is false, as is
“Sx = −1/2 and Sz = 1/2”. The normal rules of logic would then tell us that both Sx = 1/2
and Sx = −1/2 are false, which cannot be the case, since one is the negation of the other.
Consequently, the usual rules of logical reasoning have to be modified if one uses the Birkhoff
and von Neumann system. By contrast, in the consistent history approach, “Sx = 1/2 and
Sz = 1/2” is neither true nor false; instead, it is meaningless. Thus the truth of Sz = 1/2
tells us nothing at all about Sx, so we do not reach a contradiction.
Similarly, in the consistent history approach it makes no sense to ask “is Sx = 1/2 or
is Sz = 1/2?”, for such a question implicitly assumes that the two can be compared: one
is true and the other false, or perhaps both are true, or both are false. But none of these
is possible under the rules of consistent history reasoning [25]. Unless propositions belong
to the same framework, which in the particular example we are considering (but not in
general; see below and App. A) is equivalent to requiring that the corresponding projectors
commute with each other, the consistent history formalism allows no logical comparison
between them, of any kind. In particular, it is very important to distinguish incompatible,
which is the relationship between Sx = 1/2 and Sz = 1/2, from mutually exclusive, the
relationship between Sz = 1/2 and Sz = −1/2. As already noted, the truth of Sz = 1/2
tells us nothing at all about the truth or falsity of the incompatible Sx = 1/2. However,
the truth of Sz = 1/2 at once implies that Sz = −1/2 is false, since the two are mutually
exclusive: if a spin half particle emerges in one channel from a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, it
surely does not emerge in the other channel.
Standard textbook quantum mechanics escapes the dilemma of (4.3) by yet a different
method, by ignoring it and treating a quantum system as a “black box” which can be sub-
jected to external (classical?) measurements. But ignoring a problem does not necessarily
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make it go away, and the enormous conceptual confusion which besets “the measurement
problem” in standard quantum theory is an almost inevitable consequence of its inability to
provide clear principles for discussing the properties of a spin half particle.
B. Generalization to histories
In CHQR, two frameworks or consistent families F and F ′ were defined to be incom-
patible if they lack a common refinement, that is, if there is no consistent family G which
contains all the histories in both F and F ′. Consistent with that usage, we shall say that two
histories Y and Y ′ are incompatible if there is no (single) consistent family which contains
both of them, and a framework F and a history Y ′ are incompatible if there is no consistent
family G which contains Y ′ along with all the histories in F . The spin half case discussed
above is best thought of as a “quantum analogy” which illustrates some, but not all of the
features of incompatibility. In particular, it shows how incompatibility can arise when the
projectors representing properties at a single time do not commute with each other. This is
also the source of incompatibility for the histories and families discussed in Sec. II C, where
the projectors on the Hilbert space of histories (as in (2.6) and (2.11)) do not commute
with each other. Incompatibility can also arise because, even though the relevant projectors
commute, consistency conditions are not satisfied for the enlarged Boolean algebra. For an
example, see Sec. VI D in CHQR (and App. A below).
Whatever the source of incompatibility, consistent histories quantum theory deals with it
in the manner suggested above in the discussion of a spin half particle, through a syntactical
rule which states that all logical argumentation must take place inside a single framework or
consistent history (for details, see CHQR). On the other hand, the usual rules of reasoning
apply within a single framework, and for these purposes no modifications of standard propo-
sitional logic are required. And, just as in the case of a spin half particle, it is important
to distinguish quantum incompatibility, which means no comparison is possible between two
histories (or results calculated in two frameworks), from mutually exclusive, the relationship
between two elementary families belonging to the same framework. Thus if A and B are
mutually exclusive, the truth of one implies the falsity of the other or, as histories, the
occurrence of A means that B did not occur, and vice versa. If, on the other hand, A and
B are incompatible, the truth of one, which can only be defined relative to some framework
which contains it, tells us nothing about the truth or falsity of the other; they are “not
comparable”: no comparisons between them are possible, because such comparisons make
no (quantum mechanical) sense. In particular, if A and B are incompatible histories, the
question “did A occur or did B occur?” does not make sense, for there is no framework in
which they could be compared.
We have already applied these principles in discussing the examples in Sec. II, in par-
ticular when noting that no discussion of the MQS state S at time t2 can be meaningfully
combined with the histories (2.11) used in F2 to discuss which detector detected the photon.
Similarly, the family F1 of unitary time evolution cannot be used to discuss, much less an-
swer, the question “which detector?”, because F1 is incompatible with histories containing
C∗ or D∗ at t2. And since, as noted above, incompatibility prevents us from asking whether
the history Ψ0 ⊙ sCD⊙ S occurred rather than Ψ0⊙ sCD⊙C∗D or Ψ0 ⊙ sCD⊙CD∗, it
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does not make sense to ask which of the incompatible frameworks F1 and F2 provides the
correct description of this gedanken experiment.
Generalizing from this example, we conclude that whenever F and G are any two incom-
patible families, one cannot ask which provides the correct quantum mechanical description;
because the two sample spaces are mutually incompatible, they cannot be compared. But
even if F and G are compatible, it also makes no sense to ask which is correct, for in that
case their relationship is analogous to that of two classical coarse grainings, as discussed in
Sec. III, and it is obvious that one cannot say that one coarse graining provides a “correct”
and another an “incorrect” physical description. Since alternative frameworks are either
compatible or incompatible, we conclude that it is never sensible to ask “which is the cor-
rect framework?”, at least in the same sense in which one can ask “which is the correct
classical phase space trajectory?”. The relationship between phase space trajectories is that
between mutually exclusive possibilities, whereas quantum frameworks are not related to
each other in this way. Of course it does make sense to ask “which framework is useful
for solving this particular problem?”, or “which framework provides one with the greatest
physical insight?”, just as in the case of classical coarse grainings.
C. Using measurements to confirm histories
Further insight into how the descriptions provided by two or more incompatible families
are related to each other can be obtained by asking how the predictions of consistent history
quantum theory about the behavior of a closed quantum system might, in principle, be
verified experimentally. Imagine that the system is in a closed box, the initial state Ψ0 is
known, and the consistent historian (who, needless to say, is outside the box [26]) has carried
out calculations of probabilities for different histories belonging to a variety of distinct and
mutually incompatible families. How might these probabilities be checked by measurements?
Checking them involves opening the box, or at least letting the contents interact in some
way with the external world, and this immediately raises the well-known problem that
measurements might disturb what is going on in the box, so that the results they reveal
might not be indicative of what would have happened in their absence. However, the very
same objection can be raised in a “classical” context in which specifically quantum effects
play no role. A box might contain sensitive photographic film which would be changed if
one were to look at it. Or perhaps the box contains a bird which will escape if the box is
opened.
In the end there is no ultimate proof that one’s measurement is not creating the effect
observed, just as there can be no ultimate argument against solipsism. However, if he had
a theory which was sufficiently powerful to predict the perturbing effects of a measurement,
and if other predictions of this theory for other situations had been amply confirmed by
experiment, a physicist (in contrast to a philosopher) would probably be willing to use it
in order to design measurements which produced minimal perturbations, or to calculate the
effects of perturbations if these were unavoidable. Consistent history quantum mechanics is
a theory of this sort, unlike standard textbook quantum mechanics, whose inability to relate
the results of measurements to properties of the system being measured is one of its principal
deficiencies. Of course, using this approach cannot demonstrate that the consistent history
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predictions of what is going on in a closed box are “really true”, but it does provide the
sort of internally consistency which in other areas of science (e.g., the study of the earth’s
core by means of seismic waves) is considered good evidence for the existence of phenomena
which cannot be directly observed.
As an example, consider Fig. 2(a), which is a stripped down version of the gedanken
experiment in Fig. 1, as the detectors C and D have been omitted from the quantum system
enclosed in the box indicated by the heavy line. We consider two consistent families E1 and
E2 with histories of non-zero weight:
E1 : a⊙ c, a⊙ d (4.7)
E2 : a⊙ s (4.8)
referring to events at the times t0 and t1; the notation is that of Sec. II.
To check the predictions of E1, we open holes in the sides of the box, Fig. 2(b), at a time
just before the photon would have encountered one of the walls, to allow it to pass out of the
box and be detected by one of the two detectors C and D. Since the two histories in (4.7)
are predicted to occur with probability 1/2, checking this requires repeating the experiment
a number of times. To determine whether opening the holes and placing detectors outside
the box has somehow perturbed the system, we employ a consistent history analysis of the
larger closed system which includes the original box and the detectors C and D (along with
the mechanism for opening the holes, etc.). For this larger system we ask: if the photon
is detected by C, was it earlier (while the holes were still closed) in the c channel? The
answer is affirmative; see (2.17) and the associated discussion. As in each realization of the
experiment the particle is detected by C or D, this confirms the usual consistent history
interpretation of the two histories in (4.7) as mutually exclusive alternatives, one or the
other of which must occur in any particular case.
If we employ family E2, the single history in (4.8) is predicted to occur every time the
experiment is carried out. To verify this requires the slightly more complicated arrangement
shown in Fig 2(c). Once again, the holes are opened at the last possible instant, but then
a pair of mirrors and a second beam splitter are used to compare the phases of the wave
packets emerging in the c and d channels. Assume the path lengths are arranged so that a
photon initially in a eventually emerges in f . The fact that the photon is always detected
by F , and never by E, can then be used as an experimental confirmation that it was in the
state s at t1, since a consistent history analysis of the larger closed system yields the result
Pr(s1 |Ψ0 ∧ F2) = 1. (4.9)
Once again, it is the ability of consistent histories to verify that a measured system had
a particular property before the measurement took place which lends plausibility to the
experimental confirmation of a prediction referring to processes going on in a closed system.
Checking events at intermediate, rather than final times in a family of histories can be
carried out using analogous, though somewhat more complicated arrangements. One can
imagine the box to be supplied with ports through which probes of appropriate type can
be inserted at appropriate times. The argument that this sort of measurement is possible
in principle (that is, without violating the laws of quantum theory), and that appropriate
measurements do not perturb the system in unacceptable ways, will be found in Sec. 5 of [1].
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Alternatively, one can suppose that a single closed box contains both the system of interest
and appropriate measuring apparatus which interacts with the system at suitable times
and records the results. At the end of the experiment the box is opened and the records
are read. In either case, the consistent history approach allows one to discuss whether the
system actually did have the properties which the measurements revealed, and whether these
measurements perturbed the system in unacceptable ways.
Whether the events of interest occur at intermediate or final times, checking the predic-
tions given by different incompatible frameworks always involves alternative experimental
arrangements which are either mutually exclusive, as in Fig. 2(b) and (c), or of a sort in
which one set of measurements makes it impossible to discuss the system using some alter-
native consistent family. In any case, just as there is no single “correct” choice of consistent
family for describing the system, there is no single arrangement of apparatus which can be
used to verify the predictions obtained using different families.
Note that neither the framework nor the experimental arrangement needed to check
its predictions is singled out by some “law of nature”. Indeed, were there some such law
which told us, for example, that E1 is the correct framework, we would have great difficulty
interpreting the results of measurements of the sort shown in Fig. 2(c). In this sense, the
physicist’s freedom to choose a framework, as suggested by the classical analogies in Sec. III,
is not only possible in the presence of quantum incompatibility, but appears necessary in
order to have a theory with a consistent physical interpretation.
V. SUMMARY AND SOME APPLICATIONS
A. Overall summary
The example in Sec. II together with the classical analogies in Sec. III and the discussion
of incompatibility in Sec. IV lead to the following conclusions relative to the problems of
choice and incompatibility as stated at the end of Sec. II. There are many posable consistent
families or frameworks which can be used to describe the same quantum system, and the
choice of which of these to employ is a choice made by the physicist based upon pragmatic
considerations, namely the type of physical problem he is trying to study or the question
he wants to answer. Because of quantum incompatibility, a question such as “where was
the photon before it was detected?” can be answered in certain frameworks and not in
others. Given a particular physical question there are still, in general, a large number
of frameworks in which it can be discussed, but since they all yield the same values for
the relevant conditional probabilities, choosing among them is, relative to this particular
question, rather like the choice of gauge in classical electromagnetism: the answer does not
depend upon the framework.
The choice among alternative compatible families is closely analogous to the choice among
coarse grainings of a classical phase space, a situation in which it is transparently obvious
that the physicist’s choice of a mode of description has no influence whatsoever on the
physical system being described. Furthermore, such a choice is not “subjective” in any
unacceptable way, for two physicists who use the same coarse graining will reach identical
conclusions. That these same conclusions are still correct in the case of a choice between
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incompatible consistent families is not so obvious, because there is no good classical anal-
ogy. Nonetheless, their truth is supported by the discussion of quantum incompatibility in
Sec. IV. To begin with, the relationship of incompatibility between frameworks (or between
histories, etc.) is quite distinct from that between mutually exclusive alternatives (as in
a sample space), where the correctness of one means that the others are necessarily false.
Incompatible frameworks are never related in this way; and from the fact that some his-
tory has occurred, one cannot conclude that some other history incompatible with it has
not occurred. Understanding the difference between mutually exclusive and incompatible
helps prevent one from supposing that the physicist’s choice of a framework somehow influ-
ences the world by “preventing” or “interfering with” histories which occur in some other
framework. Instead, the choice simply limits the type of description which the physicist can
construct.
Additional support is provided by the discussion, in Part C of Sec. IV, of how predic-
tions of what goes on in a closed system based upon the consistent histories formalism,
can in principle be checked experimentally. This “operational” point of view confirms that
the choice of consistent family is up to the physicist, but that the experimental arrange-
ments needed to confirm the predictions made using a particular framework depend upon
that framework. By contrast, assuming that the framework is determined by some “law
of nature”, rather than chosen by the physicist, is rather unhelpful, since it produces new
conceptual difficulties.
Incompatibility, as noted in Sec. IV A, is a specifically quantum concept which represents
one way of meeting the (necessary!) process of modifying the logic of classical propositions
in order to achieve descriptions which conform to the way standard quantum theory employs
Hilbert space. In the consistent history approach, incompatibility is a syntactical rule which
governs which combinations of propositions about a quantum system can be said to be
physically meaningful. In this respect it is quite different from the approach of Birkhoff
and von Neumann [24], and has the advantage that within a single consistent family there
is no need to replace the ordinary logic of propositions with a new “quantum logic”. (By
contrast, textbook quantum mechanics in effect evades the logical issues by constructing
a phenomenological theory of measurement, thus giving rise to an insoluble “measurement
problem” completely absent from the consistent histories approach.)
To be sure, quantum incompatibility and the choice among incompatible frameworks for
describing a particular quantum system are not matters which can be easily understood using
an intuition trained largely by the “classical” world of everyday experience. This should
come as no surprise: quantum mechanics is distinctly different from classical mechanics,
and it is only to be expected that it contains concepts which conflict with pre-quantum
thinking. The same is true of special relativity in relationship to Newtonian mechanics.
The fact that events which occur at the same time in one coordinate system need not be
simultaneous in another, and the physicist’s ability to change the time difference between
them by adopting a new coordinate system, have not been considered insuperable barriers, or
even serious objections to adopting special relativity as a good scientific theory of the world,
and supposing that it provides a better description of physical reality than pre-relativistic
physics. Although the analogy is, of course, not perfect, there seems to be no reason why the
physicist’s liberty to choose a consistent family renders consistent histories an unsatisfactory
interpretation of quantum theory, nor why quantum incompatibility should not be included
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with our other ideas about what constitutes physical reality.
B. Logic, truth, and reality
The structure of quantum reasoning set forth in CHQR, which is largely compatible with
earlier work by Omne`s [4,6], agrees with but also differs from ordinary propositional logic,
depending upon one’s point of view. As long as the discussion is confined to a single frame-
work (or “logic”, in Omne`s’ terminology) the usual rules employed for ordinary probabilistic
theories apply, and no new logical concepts are required. In this respect one can agree with
Omne`s that consistent histories quantum theory does not require a new “unconventional
logic” [27].
On the other hand, the syntactical rules which determine what propositions can be
part of a framework, whether two frameworks are compatible, and the like, are decidedly
non-classical, since their very definitions are based upon properties of the quantum Hilbert
space and the corresponding unitary time transformations. As these rules are essential for
correct quantum reasoning, and are thus central to the logical structure of quantum theory,
it is also correct to say that, as least in this respect, consistent histories does involve a
new form of logic, one with no classical counterpart. Thus d’Espagnat’s assertion [28] that
consistent histories reasoning “. . . could only be valid in some as yet unspecified logic, of
which it is not even known how it could be self-consistent” is not off the mark, though it
is now out of date, since in CHQR the required self-consistent logic has been specified in
considerable detail, filling in various items lacking in the earlier [5]. As noted in Sec. IVA,
the use of some form of non-classical reasoning is virtually inescapable once one accepts the
association of propositions, and their negations, with subspaces of Hilbert space, in the way
generally employed in standard quantum theory. Whereas consistent histories handles this
in a very different way from the quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neumann, it still employs
non-classical (and hence counterintuitive) ideas.
One important difference between Omne`s and CHQR is in the definition of “true”. In
CHQR, “true” is interpreted as “probability one”. Thus if certain data are assumed to
be true, and the probability, conditioned upon these data, of a certain proposition is one,
then this proposition is true. The advantage of this approach is that as long as one sticks
to a single framework, “true” functions in essentially the same way as in ordinary logic
and probability theory. However, because probabilities can only be discussed within some
framework, comparisons of “true” between incompatible frameworks are impossible, and
in this sense “true” interpreted as “probability one” must be understood as relative to a
framework.
The feature just mentioned has been criticized by d’Espagnat [12,13,15]. But it is hard
to see how to get around it if one wishes to maintain (as do Omne`s and I) that reasoning
inside a single framework should follow classical rules, and classical rules associate “true” (in
a probabilistic theory) with “probability one”. Omne`s’ attempt to develop an alternative
definition of “true” [4,6] did not succeed [17] , as he himself admits [29], and at present there
seems to be no serious alternative to CHQR. In defense of the latter it is worth noting that,
as a very general principle, one cannot expect to import classical concepts into quantum
theory “duty free”, that is, without alterations, either in formal definitions, or in intuitive
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properties, or both. This is widely accepted by physicists in the case of dynamical quantities:
we do not insist that quantum position and momentum commute with each other. That it
also holds for logical properties and relationships deserves to be more widely appreciated;
see the discussion of “not” and “and” in Sec. IVA (and of “contrary” in App. A). Thus it
is unreasonable to expect that “quantum truth” will coincide with “classical truth” in every
respect. The definition adopted in CHQR has some virtues; these include the fact that it is
(almost) the same as its classical counterpart in the case of a single framework, and reduces
to the usual sense of “true” in the classical (correspondence) limit in which incompatibility
disappears and all frameworks possess a common refinement. Given these properties, it
seems reasonable to adopt the definition given in CHQR as a suitable quantum counterpart
of “true”, at least until some superior alternative appears on the scene.
Similarly, d’Espagnat [30] thinks that consistent history quantum theory cannot be inter-
preted in a realistic way, because it does not conform to “a basic requirement of traditional
realism, that there are facts that are true quite independently of the conventions we decide
to make as to which consistent family of histories we prefer to discuss.” In response, it
is worth noting that some modifications of traditional realism are only to be expected if
quantum theory is one of the truly revolutionary developments of twentieth century science.
Nevertheless, the changes in pre-quantum realism required if we adopt consistent histories
are perhaps less radical than d’Espagnat’s words might suggest.
Note, first of all, that the choice of framework by a physicist is not something by which
he can, in any sense, render true propositions untrue, or make untrue propositions true. The
reason is that as long as frameworks are compatible, choosing one or another is as “harmless”
as selecting one of the alternative coarse grainings of classical phase space, as discussed in
Sec. III. If, on the other hand, some framework is chosen which is incompatible with a
proposition, this choice does not make the proposition true or false; instead the proposition
is “indiscussible” within this framework.
As this point is often misunderstood, it may be helpful consider the specific example
discussed in Part C of Sec. IV. Suppose that theorist T, standing outside the box of Fig. 2,
has used family E2, (4.8), to make a prediction, and experimentalist E has set up the appa-
ratus to test it using the arrangement in Fig. 2(c). Suppose a second theorist, T*, carries
out calculations using the incompatible family E1 instead. Will this alter what is going on
inside the box? Obviously not; E’s confirmation of T’s prediction will be entirely unaffected
by T*’s calculation! On the other hand, T* will, if he limits himself to E1, be unable to
provide a coherent account of how E’s measurement confirms T’s prediction. In order to do
that, T* needs to employ E2. If he does so, he will, of course, obtain the same result as T.
On the other hand, if T* can persuade E to carry out an alternative experiment using the
arrangement of Fig. 2(b)—this cannot, of course, be done at the same time as the experi-
ment in Fig. 2(c), but might be done later using a second photon—then this, or at least a
sufficient number of experiments of this type, will confirm T*’s result, a situation which T
can understand if he, too, employs E1.
As well as showing that the choice of framework does not imply some mysterious influence
of mind upon matter, this example illustrates some other aspects of quantum reality as
viewed using consistent histories. The existence of a choice of framework does not render
quantum theory subjective, for if T and T* adopt the same framework, they come to the
same conclusion. Predictions of what is going on in a quantum system can, in principle,
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be checked experimentally; the theorist’s freedom to choose a framework merely means that
alternative experimental arrangements are needed to check predictions made using different
frameworks.
Objective descriptions (in the sense just discussed), experimental confirmation, and the
absence of peculiar influences of mind over matter are aspects of traditional realism which
continue to hold true in the quantum realm if we accept the results of consistent histories.
But there is also something very different: one cannot simultaneously employ E2 and E1 for
describing what is going on in the closed box. Not because using one of them makes the
other false, but because there is no way of combining the results from the two incompatible
families. Thus a “unicity” always present in classical physics, the ability to combine any
two descriptions of the same system in a single description, is absent in quantum theory. If
one wishes to maintain that this unicity is truly indispensable to realism, then, obviously,
consistent history quantum theory cannot be said to be “realistic”. The alternative, which
of course I favor, is to include quantum incompatibility as part of our understanding of what
quantum reality is all about, and why it differs from what reality was thought to be like
before the advent of quantum theory.
C. Is consistent histories a predictive theory?
As the result of a detailed study [16,17], Dowker and Kent conclude that the consistent
history approach to quantum theory lacks predictive power, and for this reason is not satis-
factory as a fundamental scientific theory. They accept the idea that once a consistent family
(“consistent set” in their terminology) is specified, one and only one of the corresponding
elementary histories will take place, and quantum theory can only assign a probability to
the different possibilities. That the theory is probabilistic in this sense is not what concerns
them. Rather, it is the fact that the consistent history approach, as a fundamental theory,
treats all frameworks or consistent families “democratically”, and provides no criterion to
select out one in particular. In other words, there is no “law of nature” which specifies
the framework. Thus, from their perspective, there is no way of calculating probabilities
of specific histories, since probabilities cannot be computed without using some framework,
and the theory does not tell one which framework to use.
Both CHQR and the present paper agree with Dowker and Kent that consistent histories,
as a fundamental theory of nature, does not single out a particular framework. The difference
is that Dowker and Kent regard this situation as unsatisfactory, whereas from the perspective
presented here there does not seem to be any problem if one regards the physicist’s choice
of framework to be like the draftsman’s choice of a perspective for representing a three-
dimensional object, or like the choice of a coarse graining of classical phase space. That is,
the choice is dictated by the problems which the physicist seeks to address, the questions he
is attempting to answer, and not by some law of nature. Given some question of physical
interest, quantum incompatibility severely limits the choice, as noted in the case of the
specific example in Sec. II, and discussed further in Sec. IV. There seems to be no reason
why an element of choice of this type should render a theory unsatisfactory. It may not
agree with certain aesthetic criteria for what constitutes “good science”, but such criteria
tend to be somewhat subjective, as in the case of Einstein’s preference for a deterministic
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rather than a probabilistic quantum theory.
Insofar as Dowker and Kent regard the choice of framework as being a choice among
mutually exclusive alternatives, which seems to be their perspective in Sec. 5.6 of [17], their
point of view is quite different from that presented above in Sec. IV: that if two frameworks
are compatible, the relationship between them is analogous to that between classical coarse
grainings, and if they are incompatible, in the quantum sense of that term, it is still not
correct to suppose that the use of one framework excludes the other in the same way that
employing one trajectory in a classical phase space excludes all other trajectories. Thus one
should never think of one framework as “correct” and another as “incorrect”, other than in
a sense like “this is the correct framework to address the problem which I have in mind”.
A particular instance of the lack of predictive power, according to Dowker and Kent,
is that consistent history quantum theory cannot answer the question, “Will the world be
quasiclassical tomorrow?” See CHQR, Sec. VII B, for a discussion of quasiclassicality in
relationship to the ideas considered here. The term “quasiclassical” is somewhat vague,
but the essence of Dowker and Kent’s concern lies in the fact that the consistent histories
formalism does not rule out the possibility of MQS states. In particular there are families in
which only “normal” (non-MQS) states occur up to some particular time, and MQS states
appear at later times, so that “quasiclassical” behavior up to some time is no guarantee that
it will continue.
The example in Sec. II can serve to illustrate this point. Family F1 contains the “non-
quasiclassical” MQS state S at t2, whereas F2 has “normal” detector states C∗D and CD∗;
at the earlier times t0 and t1 these families are identical, and the coherent superposition
state s of the photon at time t1, because it is easily achieved and detected in the laboratory,
can be considered compatible with a “quasiclassical” description. The consistent history
approach gives no reason to choose F2 rather than F1 to represent the state of affairs at t2.
On the other hand, as pointed out in Sec. IV, a question of the form “will the system be in
S, or will it be in one of the two states C∗D or CD∗ at t2?” is not meaningful, because it
requires, at least implicitly, a comparison between mutually incompatible alternatives, and
quantum incompatibility implies that no such comparison is possible, that is, it does not
make sense. It is like asking, “does the spin half particle have an x or a z component of
angular momentum?”
Note that “quasiclassical”, interpreted as “non-MQS”, is not a quantum mechanical
property as such, since it is not associated with a subspace of the quantum Hilbert space.
Thus while both |C∗D〉 and |CD∗〉 in the example of Sec. II refer to non-MQS states, the
smallest subspace which contains them also contains the MQS state |S〉. This suggests that
“quasiclassical” is best thought of as a term belonging to the metalanguage of quantum
descriptions, the language used to discuss these descriptions, rather than as a term which
can itself enter into a quantum description. To use a classical analogy, the term “large cells”
could be employed to characterize a coarse graining of a classical phase space, and it belongs
to the metalanguage, for it obviously is not correct to think of “large cells” as a property of
the physical system itself. The question “will the world be quasiclassical tomorrow?” is thus
comparable to “will tomorrow’s coarse graining use large cells?”. Both might make sense
as part of a discussion among physicists as to how to construct a description of a physical
system which best addresses the problems which interest them; neither refers directly to
properties of the system being described.
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To summarize, while it makes sense to compute probabilities of different histories given a
quasiclassical framework, it does not make sense to assign a probability to such a framework,
or treat it as one of a collection of mutually exclusive physical alternatives. Quasiclassicality
is a property of quantum descriptions, not a property of quantum systems, and the question
“is this quantum system quasiclassical?” is not meaningful, at least when understood in the
same sense as “is the energy between 9 and 10 ergs?”. For the same reason, quasiclassicality
cannot be a condition in a quantum probability, which is why a recent argument by Kent,
examined in App. B, is inconsistent with the rules of quantum reasoning given in CHQR.
Despite the obvious differences between the present paper and the approach of Dowker
and Kent, there is a sense in which the conclusions complement each other. By studying the
structure of consistent histories under the assumption that alternative consistent families are
somewhat analogous to the mutually exclusive possibilities represented by a sample space,
Dowker and Kent concluded that this approach does not result in a satisfactory scientific
theory. That is perfectly compatible with the perspective of the present paper.
A rather different approach to consistent histories was considered by Dowker and Kent
in Sec. 5.4 of [17] under the title “many histories”. See the following section for some
comments.
D. List of histories
Given any consistent family of histories for a particular system, one and only one of the
elementary histories will actually occur. This statement makes it tempting to suppose that
it is possible to construct a list {Fj, Fj} which assigns to every consistent family Fj a history
Fj , understood as the history which actually occurred in a particular system or a particular
realization of an experiment. This temptation should be resisted; no such list exists, at least
if it is interpreted in the manner just suggested.
Note that if the Fj are alternative coarse grainings of a classical phase space, the existence
of such a list is not in doubt, for one simply takes whatever classical trajectory actually
occurs, and employs it to generate the history Fj by noting which cell of Fj is occupied by
the trajectory at each time. In the same way, if the quantum list contains only consistent
families which are mutually compatible with one another, the list can be constructed by
using the common refinement.
When, however, incompatible families occur in the list—as will necessarily be the case
if all consistent families are included—the quantum list does not make sense. Consider the
example in Sec. II. For F1 there is only one history, (2.6), with positive weight, which must
therefore be F1. For F2 there are two histories with positive weights, (2.11), so F2 must be
one of these. But whichever it is, it makes no sense to say that a single system (and a single
experimental run) can be correctly described by both F1 and F2, since at t2 the detectors
cannot be said to be in the MQS state S and also in one of the states C∗D or CD∗.
To be sure, one might adopt an alternative interpretation of the list {Fj, Fj}, and un-
derstand it as referring to what happens in distinct but nominally identical systems, or in
successive repetitions of an experiment, labeled by the subscript j. In such a case there is
no problem, for it is not necessary to use the same framework every time an experiment
is carried out, or for describing different systems. But this is obviously a very different
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interpretation of the list from that employed above.
Dowker and Kent’s “many histories” interpretation, Sec. 5.4 of [17], involves such a
list, although their interpretation of what it means is not very clear. If it is thought of as
applying to a single system, or a single universe, then at least from the perspective adopted
in this paper, it does not make much (quantum mechanical) sense. It is only fair to add
that Dowker and Kent themselves show very little enthusiasm for their “many histories”
interpretation .
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APP. A. CONSISTENT HISTORIES AND CONTRARY INFERENCES
In recent work [19,20], Kent has stated that the consistent history approach cannot
be taken seriously as a fundamental theory because it allows for what he calls “contrary
inferences”. We shall show that the problem is not with consistent histories quantum theory
as presented in CHQR and the present paper, but rather with Kent’s definition of “contrary”,
which fails to take proper account of quantum incompatibility when it arises from violations
of consistency conditions. For a condensed version of these remarks, see [31].
The Aharonov-Vaidman [32] example discussed in CHQR Sec. VI D can be used to
illustrate the central point of Kent’s argument. A particle can be in one of three states |A〉,
|B〉, or |C〉, and the dynamics is trivial: |A〉 7→ |A〉, etc. Define
|Φ〉 = (|A〉+ |B〉+ |C〉)/
√
3, |Ψ〉 = (|A〉+ |B〉 − |C〉)/
√
3, (5.1)
and (consistent with previous notation) let a letter outside a ket denote the corresponding
projector, and a tilde its complement, thus:
A = |A〉〈A|, A˜ = I − A = B + C, (5.2)
etc. Define a consistent family A of histories starting with Φ at time t0, followed by A or
A˜ at a later time t1, and Ψ at a still later time t2. It is straightforward to show, using this
framework, that
Pr(A1 |Φ0 ∧Ψ2) = 1, (5.3)
where the subscripts indicate the time associated with the corresponding event. That is, we
can be sure that the particle was in state A at t1, given the initial state Φ at t0 and the final
state Ψ at t2. An alternative framework B, incompatible with A, uses the same events at t0
and t2, and B and B˜ at t1. Using B, one finds
Pr(B1 |Φ0 ∧Ψ2) = 1. (5.4)
23
Kent defines two projectors A and B to be “contrary” provided
AB = BA = 0, A 6= B˜, (5.5)
and employs the term “contradictory” when A = B˜. Since A and B in the Aharonov-
Vaidman example satisfy (5.5), Kent would conclude that (5.3) and (5.4) are two probability-
one inferences based on the same data, Φ0 ∧ Ψ2, to two contrary events, and he finds this
feature of the consistent history approach to be problematical.
To analyze this argument, we first note that the term contrary has a well-defined usage
in classical logic [33], where it indicates the relationship between two propositions which
cannot both be true, but might both be false. “The queen is in London” and “the queen
is in Cambridge” are contrary propositions in this sense: they are mutually exclusive, so
they cannot both be true, but they could both be false (if the queen is in some other city).
Similarly, contradictory is reserved for the relationship of two propositions which cannot
both be true, and also cannot both be false. For example, “the queen is in London” is false
if and only if “the queen is not in London” is true, and vice versa.
Translating terms from classical logic into appropriate quantum counterparts is not a
trivial exercise; see CHQR and Sec. IV of the present paper. As long as A and B belong
to the same consistent family, (5.5) is a reasonable quantum counterpart for the classical
term “contrary”, and agrees with the rules worked out in CHQR. The problem with Kent’s
argument is that he wishes to apply the same definition in a case in which A and B do not
belong to the same consistent family. In the Aharonov-Vaidman example, B is incompatible,
in the quantum mechanical sense (Sec. IV) with the family A used to obtain (5.3), while
A is incompatible with the family B used to obtain (5.4). When quantum incompatibility
obtains, the consistent history approach, for reasons indicated in Sec. IV, disallows any
logical comparison whatsoever. Thus as long as one is considering inferences based upon
the data Φ0 ∧Ψ2, A and B are best thought of as “incomparable”, and speaking of them as
“contrary” in a sense similar to that used in classical logic is misleading.
To put the matter in another way, in order to be able to say that A and B are contrary
in the sense of classical logic, consistent history rules require that they belong to the same
framework. However, any framework which contains both A and B at t1 cannot also contain
both Φ at t0 and Ψ at t2. Consequently, in a framework in which it would be correct to
say that A and B are contrary, neither of the inferences (5.3) and (5.4) is possible. So,
whichever way one looks at the matter, there are no “contrary inferences”. The key point is
that consistent history reasoning, as clearly stated by Omne`s [34] and reiterated in CHQR,
must employ a single framework, and Kent’s argument violates this rule through defining
[35] “contrary” in a manner which allows it to hold as a relationship between propositions
which are not members of a single framework.
The same point can be made in a slightly different way. In Sec. II we exhibited two
probability one inferences, in (2.17) and (2.18), based upon identical conditions but carried
out in two incompatible families, F3 and F2. The nonsensical result (2.19) of combining these
two inferences was blocked by the consistent history rule that results deduced in incompatible
families cannot be combined. It is precisely this same rule which applies in the case of (5.3)
and (5.4). The only difference is that while a quantum comparison of c and s from (2.17)
and (2.18) is obviously nonsensical, because the projectors do not commute, that of A and B
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as inferred in (5.3) and (5.4) is not as transparently incorrect, since the projectors commute,
even though one has an equally serious violation of precisely the same consistent history
rule. Note that quantum incompatibility can arise in the consistent histories approach both
because certain projectors do not commute and because consistency rules are violated. The
incompatibility of A with B, and of B with A, is of the latter type, which is why it is a bit
less evident than the incompatibility of c and s in the example of Sec. II.
In summary, to say that A and B are “contrary” in a logical sense when they belong to
incompatible frameworks is a violation of one of the basic principles of consistent history
reasoning, at least as the subject has been developed up to now. To be sure, there may exist
alternative approaches to consistent histories based upon a different sent of logical rules, and
one might view Kent’s argument as, in effect, proposing such an alternative. In that case
there would be no reason to disagree with his conclusion, which would be that this alternative
proposal constitutes a formalism which cannot be taken seriously as a fundamental theory
of nature, for precisely the reasons which he points out.
Finally, a comment on the question which Kent raises in the latter part of [19]: why
should the formalism of consistent histories rule out inferences to two “contradictory” propo-
sitions while allowing inferences to two “contrary” propositions? The brief response is that,
according to the formalism for consistent histories developed in CHQR, neither “contrary”
nor “contradictory” can be defined as logical relationships unless both of the properties (or
histories) being compared are found in the same consistent family. Thus this formalism
never allows an inference to either “contradictory” or “contrary” pairs of propositions, and
so the question raised by Kent does not arise. Of course, alternative formulations of consis-
tent histories which construct logical definitions in a way which allows contrary inferences
to occur are subject to the conceptual problem which Kent has pointed out, and have to
deal with it in some way. For one such alternative, see [20]
APP. B. CONDITIONING UPON QUASICLASSICALITY
Kent has claimed that even if one assumes that the world will be quasiclassical tomorrow,
the consistent history approach does not always yield probabilistic predictions which agree
with those provided by Copenhagen (i.e., standard textbook) quantum theory. The following
example illustrates his argument, and shows why it cannot be considered a serious objection
to consistent histories as described in CHQR and the present paper.
Suppose the beamsplitter in the example in Sec. II (Fig 1) is replaced by one which pro-
duces beams in three exit channels c, d, and e, corresponding to a unitary time development
|a〉 7→ (|c〉+ |d〉+ |e〉)/
√
3 (5.6)
in place of (2.1). A third detector E is added for the e channel, so that
|e〉|E〉 7→ |E∗〉 (5.7)
in addition to (2.2). We now consider two consistent families involving two times, t0 and t2:
D1 : Ψ0 ⊙ {C∗DE, CD∗E, CDE∗}, (5.8)
D2 : Ψ0 ⊙ {SE, CDE∗}, (5.9)
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where the initial state (the counterpart of (2.4)) is
|Ψ0〉 = |aCDE〉, (5.10)
|S〉 is the MQS combination of |C∗D〉 and |D∗C〉 defined in (2.5), and the curly brackets
in (5.8) and (5.9) enclose alternative possibilities at t2. As usual, various histories of zero
weight have been omitted.
A straightforward analysis using D1 yields
Pr(C∗DE |Ψ0) = Pr(CD∗E |Ψ0) = Pr(CDE∗ |Ψ0) = 1/3, (5.11)
that is, the probability is 1/3 that each of the detectors will have detected the photon,
whereas from D2 one concludes that
Pr(SE |Ψ0) = 2/3, Pr(CDE∗ |Ψ0) = 1/3. (5.12)
The fact that Pr(CDE∗ |Ψ0) is the same in both cases reflects a general property of the
consistent histories approach, as noted in Sec. II.
Kent would accept (5.11) and (5.12) as correct, but would then argue that if one condi-
tions upon quasiclassicality, the probability that E detects the photon is different in families
D1 and D2; to be specific:
D1 : Pr(CDE∗ |Ψ0 ∧ quasiclassical) = 1/3, (5.13)
D2 : Pr(CDE∗ |Ψ0 ∧ quasiclassical) = 1. (5.14)
The argument is that all three histories in D1 are quasiclassical (no MQS states), and thus
each has a probability 1/3, whether or not one conditions upon quasiclassicality. On the
other hand, in D2 the only quasiclassical history is Ψ0⊙CDE∗, since the other involves the
far-from-classical superposition S, and thus conditioning upon quasiclassicality yields (5.14)
in place of (5.12).
The problem with this argument, if one adopts the point of view of CHQR, is that condi-
tional probabilities are only defined when their arguments are projectors belonging to an ap-
propriate Boolean algebra satisfying consistency conditions. But, as noted in Sec. VC, there
is no subspace of the Hilbert space, and hence no projector, corresponding to “quasiclassi-
cal”, understood in the present context as “non-MQS”. Thus the conditional probabilities
(5.13) and (5.14) are undefined, and no argument based upon them can be valid.
Is there some way to define “quasiclassical” as a condition entering into a probability
without referring to a subspace of the Hilbert space? If, as suggested in Sec. VC, the
term “quasiclassical” belongs to the metalanguage rather than the language of quantum
descriptions, such a definition would change the meaning of the resulting probabilities in an
important way. Thus imagine that D1 and D2 were two coarse grainings of a classical phase
space using cells of different sizes. Then by conditioning upon the initial condition and the
fact that the history only involves, say, large cells, one could produce a difference analogous
to that between (5.13) and (5.14). But the result would obviously have no direct physical
significance, although it might be useful in addressing the question of which coarse graining
is most useful for a numerical simulation.
Of course, there may be some alternative to CHQR in which “quasiclassical” refers
directly to a quantum property. In that case, Kent’s argument would indicate that this
alternative (in contrast to CHQR) is not likely to reproduce standard quantum physics.
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Fig. 1. Beamsplitter B and detectors C and D.
Fig. 2. Histories for the closed system in (a) can be confirmed using either the configu-
ration shown in (b) or the one in (c).
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